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Abstract
Arthur Calwell's antagonism to the press was shared by most Australian Labor Party politicians, who
explained their setbacks, such as electoral defeats, in terms of opposition from the media, in particular, from
the 'capitalist press'. While Arthur Calwell was more bitterly critical than were most others, this was due
chiefly to his ability to express himself, which exceeded that of most of his colleagues. Besides, as Minister for
Information, in charge of censorship, he was most likely to provide a target for the press. It would be wrong to
explain the conflict, as Alan Reid did, as having been due to his failure to make J.J. Curtin's first Ministry:
'Whatever the newspapers and newspapermen did, they were not going to ignore him, Arthur Calwell, the
man who had run the A.L.P. machine in Victoria and told successive State Administrations where they got off '.
He added: 'What had started as a tactical ploy became an obsession ... a real hatred which lasted for
years...Only in recent times has this abated'.
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ARTHUR A . GkL,'iLLL1 S
c l a s h e s  .;i t h  t h e
aU STR aLIaN  PRESS , 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 4 5
by Colm K i e m a n .
Arthur Calwell's antagonism to the press was 
shared by most Australian Labor Party politicians, who 
explained their setbacks, such as electoral defeats, in 
terms of opposition frcm the media, in particular, from 
the 'capitalist press'. While Arthur Calwell was more 
bitterly critical than were most others, this was due 
chiefly to his ability to express himself, which 
exceeded that of most of his colleagues. Besides, as 
Minister for Information, in charge of censorship, he 
was most likely to provide a target for the press. It 
would be wrong to explain the conflict, as Alan Reid 
did, as having been due to his failure to make J.J. 
Curtin's first Ministry: 'Whatever the newspapers and 
newspapermen did, they were not going to ignore him,
l k
Arthur Calwell, the man who had run the A.L.P. machine 
in Victoria and told successive State administrations 
where they got off1. He added: 'What had started as 
a tactical ploy became an obsession... a real hatred 
which lasted for years...Only in recent times has this 
abated1 (1 ).
Arthur Calwell1s critical attitude was due to 
his belief that the press influenced public opinion and 
that, as it was controlled by moneyed interests, it 
worked against the Australian Labor Party. This was 
a conventional Party attitude, which differed with 
Arthur Calwell only in degree. He was ready, given the 
opportunity, to take action against the press. It was 
because of his belief in the influence of the media, 
which he believed could be used for bad or for good ends, 
depending on who controlled it, that Arthur Calwell took 
the portfolio of Information. He reserved for the 
Australian press his strongest invective: 'The 
allegedly so-called free and democratic press. What a 
pressl It is owned for the most part by financial 
crooks and is edited for the most part by mental 
harlots' (2).
Arthur Calwell's criticism of the 'capitalist 
press* was more fundamental than is generally recognised. 
His career began and ended with a libel action against a 
newspaper. The first occurred when he was in the 
Victorian Treasury Department. It arose from an article 
by W. Kent Hughes in the Herald, proposing that Arthur 
Calwell must have experienced difficulties reconciling
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his duties as a public servant working for a non-Labor 
government with his loyalty to the Australian Labor 
Party. The case was settled out of court, when Arthur 
Calwell agreed to accept £15>0 damages against the paper 
and the same against Kent Hughes (3)- The final libel 
action, against Sunday Review, was unresolved at the 
time of Arthur Calwell's death in 1973> though it later 
went against his estate.
In 19i+0, when Arthur Calwell entered the 
Commonwealth Parliament, he was a radical socialist, 
representing a poor electorate: *1 have the privilege 
and the honour to represent what is probably the poorest 
constituency in the Commonwealth1 (I4.) . He wanted a new 
order, to be built on the ruins of capitalism: 'The 
Labor Party does not exist to mend the capitalist system, 
but to end it* (5)- He condemned capitalism on many 
different occasions (6). In particular, he held it 
responsible for the war: 'I have no doubt that if the 
capitalistic system of society remains we shall have 
recurring wars. They are inevitable. If we have an eye 
for markets and seek spheres of influence, and rival 
imperialisms take the stage, wars will be fought* (7 )- 
He believed that the press was the agency used by 
capitalism to mislead the people: *1 believe that the 
capitalist order will continue for a long time if the 
wealthy classes continue to control the press and the 
radio' (8). As Minister for Information, it was Arthur 
Calwell's intention to put an end to the alliance, to 
harness the media to what he believed to be a national
7t
policy.
There were signs of what was to come before 
Arthur Calwell's appointment as Minister for 
Information, when he had launched into a fullscale 
attack on Sir Keith Murdoch, the first Director of 
Information and the owner of several newspapers, 
including the Herald: 'I make it clear that, in my 
opinion, Public Enemy No. 1 of the liberties of the 
Australian people is the Murdoch press' (9). How 
did Sir Keith Murdoch work his way? Arthur Calwell was 
in no doubt: 'The Department of Information appears to 
be one for the employment of journalists associated 
with the Murdoch press which...indulges in subversive 
propaganda at elections to secure the return of the 
United Australia Party1 (10). More sinister still:
'The Murdoch press is more than a law unto itself; it 
is the dictator of the present Government's policy.
The Government does what the Murdoch press directs* (11). 
He said of Sir Keith Murdoch: 'I have described him 
to-night as a fifth columnist. I consider that he is a 
megalomaniac, who cannot help himself' (1 2).
To make matters worse, before he was appointed 
Minister for Information, Arthur Calwell had come into 
conflict not only with Sir Keith Murdoch, but also with 
a man who proved to be a more troublesome foe, the 
Managing Editor of the Daily Telegraph, the outspoken 
journalist Brian Penton. In 192j.2, Arthur Calwell and 
Max. Falstein brought pressure to bear on Prime Minister 
J.J. Curtin to prevent Brian Penton from going on a 
lecture tour of America. They asked a series of
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questions which suggested that Brian Penton was going to 
America to avoid military service (13)- However:
•Curtin refuses demand to cancel U.S. lecture tour1 (11,.) . 
Brian Penton hit back through the Daily Telegraph, 
calling on Arthur Calwell to repeat outside Parliament 
what he had said inside, whereupon he would be issued 
with a writ by Brian Penton: 'Or perhaps he would 
prefer to issue a writ against me? He may do so on 
this article, because I make no bones about calling 
Mr. Calwell a coward - a blackguardly coward at that.
And this statement is not made under cover of 
Parliamentary privilege* (15)- Arthur Calwell and 
Max. Falstein responded by counter-charging that Brian 
Penton was himself a coward. Max. Falstein, who 
resigned from the Commonwealth Parliament to join the 
Air Force and Arthur Calwell challenged Brian Penton 
to do likewise: **Evading military responsibilities', 
says Calwell' (16).
As things had stood in June 19z+2, the only 
sensible way of dealing with the excessive influence of 
the press had seemed to be by closing down the 
Department of Information which, in Arthur Calwell's 
eyes, was being used by the Murdoch press to spread 
alarmist stories about the war, itself nothing more 
than a device to buttress capitalism: 'We are asked 
to approve of the appropriation of £50,000 for the 
Department of Information. If ever there was a 
Department that ought to be abolished, it is that 
department* (17)- As Minister for Information, he had
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not only to change his attitude to the Department, but 
also to try to develop a sound relationship with the 
press. While he succeeded in the first, as Minister 
for Information he was unable then and for many years 
after that to come to terms with the press. His best 
efforts were offset by a series of happenings which 
poisoned the relationship between the Minister and the 
press to such a degree as to render reconciliation 
unlikely. The loser was Arthur Calwell who, like all 
politicians, depended on the press to explain his 
policies to the public. Once alienated, the press 
represented Arthur Calwell in ways that did not flatter 
him, that damaged his image both in the Australian 
Labor Party and outside it.
While it was against a background of conflict 
that Arthur Calwell was appointed Minister for 
Information, it is not enough to think that he was the 
cause of his own troubles, that his clashes with the 
press brought on him the serious reprisals that were 
to occur. The truth is that he took on a portfolio 
full of inherited tensions. Hiese came chiefly from 
the Press Censorship Advisory Ccmmittee, of which J.H. 
Scullin had been Chairman, until ill health brought 
about his retirement. The 'permanent head1 of 
censorship, E.G. Bonney, wrote to J.H. Scullin 
expressing his regret that opposition from the press 
had been able to bring about his resignation (18) . A 
long, seventeen-page letter from Sir Warwick Fairfax, 
proprietor of the Sydney Morning Herald, complaining
7*
about censorship rules, doubtless precipitated the 
resignation (19). Publicity censor E.G. Bonney 
strongly disagreed with the criticisms it contained (20), 
Briefly, the issue was whether or not there was to be 
censorship. J.H. Scullin referred the correspondence 
to Prime Minister J.J. Curtin, who answered Sir 
Warwick Fairfax’s criticisms (21). Nonetheless, the 
problem remained, that the Government wanted censorship 
in wartime, which the press did not accept, believing 
that their own discretion was ar.cugh.
While recriminations against Sir Keith Murdoch 
and Brian Penton set the stage for discord, a series of 
incidents falling close on each other brought to the 
surface Arthur Calwell's contempt for the Australian 
press. This was a reflection of his dislike of 
capitalism, which in turn grew out of his experience of 
the depression. Hie first Director-General of 
Information, appointed by R.G. Menzies, had been the 
redoutable Sir Keith Murdoch (22). Although he had 
resigned from the position, due in part to criticism 
from other newspapers that his position was incompatible 
with owning and operating the Melbourne Herald, the 
experience he gained from the position was to prove 
valuable when he found himself on the other side, 
opposing censorship.
It could only have been a matter of time before 
further difficulties developed between the Government 
and the press. It was clear from the first move he 
made in his new portfolio, ~c promote E.G. Bonney from
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being Chief Publicity Censor to become Director-General 
of Information, that Arthur Calwell did not intend to 
be put down by the press. On their side, the 
newspapers continued to insist that there was little or 
no need for censorship. Prime Minister J.J. Curtin 
arbitrated and ruled: 'Newspapers should be free to 
treat war news according to their judgment, so long as 
information useful to the enemy is not thereby 
conveyed' (23). Arthur Calwell supported the censors 
as being public spirited in what they did and condemned: 
•constant harping by city newspaper proprietors' (2ij.). 
When, on behalf of the newspapers, E. Kennedy proposed 
censorship by the Department of Information as being 
unnecessary, because the newspapers were sufficiently 
patriotic to practice self censroship, Arthur Calwell 
dismissed his idea as 'impudent* (25). When Arthur 
Calwell proposed that the opposite was true, Brian 
Penton replied: 'We challenge Mr. Calwell to take the 
Editor of this paper into court and prosecute him for 
any breach of the censorship he thinks we have 
committed' (26). This triggered Arthur Calwell to 
take time on Australian Broadcasting Corporation radio 
to condemn newspaper criticism of censorship as: 
•Insincere and unpatriotic' (27).
At the same time that there was conflict between 
the Government and the press, there was tension also 
within the Government. Early in 191+2, issue was joined 
between E.G. Bonney, who was then Chief Publicity 
Censor and Brigadier Rasmussen, who was Director-General
«/
of Public Relations, Department of the Army, over 
whether or not statements by the army, from Brigadier 
Rasmussen's section, had to be cleared by the Department 
of Information. Arthur Calwell wrote asking Prime 
Minister J.J. Curtin to resolve what was in effect a 
demarcation dispute between the two departments (28). 
While the issue was being advanced in this way,
Brigadier Rasmussen resolved it by informing E.G.
Bonney that he had prohibited a reporter employed 
by the Department of Information from returning to New 
Guinea, because he had criticised the army there.
This was the beginning of the tension that 
developed between the Department of Information and 
the Department of the Army, which henceforth released 
little information about its doings. This situation 
led to an attempt to dismiss Arthur Calwell from the 
Ministry, when he was called on by Prime Minister J.J. 
Curtin to explain why: 'I had blamed the Army 
Department for not releasing information, for which the 
newspapers and Opposition were blaming me1 (29). The 
position was that: 'In other words, he was going to 
sack me because he said I was interfering with the work 
of other Ministers'. However, Arthur Calwell was able 
to persuade the Prime Minister of the justice of his 
complaint, so that no action was taken.
For two months after the Rasmussen affair, an 
uneasy peace lasted between Arthur Calwell and the press 
It was during this time that th« Prime Minister departed 
for overseas. That was fortunate for Arthur Calwell,
9 X
because worse was to follow; and. Acting Prime Minister 
P.M. Forde was more tolerant than was J.J. Curtin of 
Arthur Calwell*s fiery behaviour. Both sides were on 
edge. The press was suspicious of the new Labor 
Government and of its Minister for Information. On his 
side, Arthur Calwell distrusted as anti-Labor the 
motives of the proprietors of the press. However, he 
felt constrained to convene the Press Censorship 
Advisory Committee, on which leading newspaper 
proprietors were represented, of which he was the 
Chairman.
While arrangements were being made to find a time 
for the meeting, three leading newspaper proprietors,
Sir Keith Murdoch, Sir Warwick Fairfax and Eric Kennedy 
jointly signed a letter to Arthur Calwell, asking him 
to say what use the Committee could be, in view of the 
wide gap that existed between the Government's 
determination to censor, compared with the newspapers' 
antipathy to censorship: 'Without going into details 
it is clear to us that you take the strongest exception 
to newspapers or newspaper executives criticising 
censorship* (30)■ Addressing his letter to Sir 
Warwick Fairfax, but intending it as an answer to them 
all, Arthur Calwell replied that, if further meetings of 
the Press Censorship Advisory Committee were not 
supported by the press: 'Then it is obvious that any 
form of censorship, no matter how important to the 
safety of the nation, is to be regarded by them as 
galling and oppressive and an unwarranted interference
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in their money-making activities - their main, in Tact 
their only, consideration' (3 1)-
The newspaper proprietors reacted angrily to 
these comments by Arthur Calwell. However, they 
persisted in asking how the Committee could work, when 
there was so little common ground between the parties 
to the controversy. Arthur Calwell referred the 
letter to E.G. Bonney, Director-General of the Department 
of Information, who advised: *1 think you will agree 
that no good purpose could be served now by having any 
further correspondence with these people* (32). In 
reply to the proprietors, Arthur Calwell merely 
acknowledged receipt of their letter. Clearly, the 
Press Censorship Advisory Committee had ceased to 
exist. The reason for both E.G. Bonney*s comment and 
for Arthur Calwell*s final letter was an extraordinary 
set of events that had occurred between the time when 
the three newspaper proprietors wrote their final letter 
and when Arthur Calwell replied to it.
The strained relationship that existed between 
the press and Arthur Calwell became clear for all to 
see on Sunday 16 April 19^4, when Arthur Calwell 
authorised the suspension of the Daily Telegraph. When 
the Sydney Morning Herald published the material for 
which the Daily Telegraph had been suspended, it too 
was suppressed: 'The Daily Telegraph did not appear on 
Sunday and both papers failed to appear to-day' (33)*
The issue arose when a blank space was left in a column 
in the first page and the first three columns of the
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third page of the Pail? Telegraph of 16 April 19kU, to 
denote censorship. Above the blank space on the first 
page was a photograph of Arthur Calwell, alongside one 
of R.A. Henderson, who was Chairman of the Australian 
Newspaper Proprietors* Association, whose speech 
criticising censorship had itself been censored.
Within the otherwise-blank space on the front page of 
the Daily Telegraph appeared a short entry, surrounded 
by a black line: *A free press? The great American 
democrat Thomas Jefferson said: 'Where the press is 
free and every man able to read it, all is safe*. On 
17 April 19l4i4-, a facsimile of the front page of the 
Daily Telegraph was published in the Sydney Morning 
Herald, when it too was suspended. Arthur Calwell 
regarded the blank space as an affront to the Chief 
Censor, E.G. Bonney who, he believed, was acting for 
the common good.
Reporting the matter to the Solicitor General, 
E.G. Bonney wrote: •The trouble had its genesis in a 
false accusation by Mr. Henderson who in a statement 
issued to the Press on April 13 said: 'Because of 
censorship most correspondents of American papers have 
been withdrawn from Australia and for the same reason 
Australian correspondents have not been able to inform 
their papers truly of Australia's great effort'* (314.). 
E.G. Bonney added that, when the truth of this claim 
was denied, R.A. Henderson had attacked censorship. 
Under an agreement reached through the Press Censorship 
Advisory Committee, that references to censorship would 
be deleted, as they would convey an impression that the
press was only a device used by the Government for 
propaganda, this speech was itself censored. It was 
this incident of censorship that had resulted in blank 
spaces in the Daily Telegraph, which were taken by the 
censor aa an indication that censorship had occurred 
and, therefore, as a breach of the agreement. The 
question to be tested was whether or not the agreement 
was binding at law.
On its side, the Sydney Morning Herald admitted 
that some of the material in R.A. Henderson's censored 
speech had rightly been censored: 'Certain items cited 
by Mr. Henderson were admittedly of a character which 
might possibly be argued as coming within the legitimate 
sphere of censorship* (35). The most contentious issue 
in R.A. Henderson's speech had been his reference to an 
article, 'Misunderstandings Abroad', which referred to 
a debate in the Congress of the United States of America 
on a report that in 1944 Australia had cut 90,000 mer. 
from its armed forces: 'The opposition disappeared when 
it was explained the cut was necessary because of a huge 
food program involving the feeding of allied forces' i3 >̂) 
Arthur Calwell believed that, regardless of the reasons, 
publicity of the fact that Australia had reduced its 
military strength ought not have appeared in an 
Australian newspaper, so that he agreed with censorship 
of further reference to that article.
In R.A. Henderson's criticism of censorship, 
he had referred to the article 'Misunderstandings Abroad' 
which was the reason why his speech was censored. Pull
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details of this could not be given at the time, because 
reduction of the armed forces by 90,000 was too important 
a matter to be bandied about. However, in explanation 
of censorship, Arthur Calwell gave the fact that 
America was being misled as justification for censoring 
R.A. Henderson's speech (37)- While criticising Arthur 
Calwell for censoring newspapers, the press censored 
Arthur Calwell1s reply to them, in particular, his 
reference to misleading America. The full text of the 
speech, showing the parts censored by the press, is in 
the Australian Archives (38)- By the same token, some 
instances of censorship were not so obviously justified 
as was the censorship of 'Misunderstandings Abroad':
'The Sydney morning newspapers to-day publish material 
which they have been ordered by the Commonwealth 
censorship not to publish1 (39), which they did to test 
the laws involved.
While the censors were probably over-zealous, 
which usually happens in wartime, it was not fair to 
charge them with political bias. Arthur Calwell 
strongly defended his censors: 'Those who say there has 
been political censorship are liars - unmitigated liars- 
and they know they are' (40). In the outcome, the 
suspension of four other newspapers, the Melbourne 
Herald, the Adelaide News, the Sydney Sun and Daily 
Mirror, was unprecedented in Australian history and 
has not been repeated since then. It was not sustained,
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because on 18 April 1944j an interim injunction was 
granted by the Commonwealth High Court, restraining 
censorship authorities from interfering with their 
publication (Lp.) - On the same day, the Sydney Morning 
Herald included as a supplement the suspended paper 
from the previous day.
R.A. Henderson's speech was being used as a test 
case. That was why on 16 April 19U-4-! 'The Daily 
Telegraph, on advice of counsel, left blank spaces to 
denote censorship eliminations' (4 2), which resulted in 
its suspension. The next day, on 17 April 1944! 'The 
Daily Telegraph attempted to publish a second statement 
by Mr. Henderson and an editorial, again with blanks 
to indicate censored portions. Thereupon Commonwealth 
police officers confiscated all editions of the
paper' (43) .
The suspension of six newspapers, four of them 
in Sydney, caused a furore. University of Sydney 
students headed a procession of about 2,000 marchers 
singing: 'We want a free press, democracy must prevail1 
In the University of Sydney Union Hall, the students 
chanted: 'Freedom of the press lies a-nouldering in 
the grave' (44)- Many clashes with police occurred: 
three young men were arrested, but were released after 
questioning. F.M. Forde, Acting Prime Minister since 
April 191*14., when J.J. Curtin had sailed for America, 
found himself in a quandary: ''People are telling me', 
he plaintively told Calwell, 'to dismiss you from the 
Cabinet'. But Forde had no power to dismiss. Curtin
held the Commission, and Curtin was overseas* (45) •
In truth, Acting Prime Minister F.M. Porde had 
the power to dismiss Arthur Calwsll. In terms of 
Australian Labor Party politics, he could only be 
halted if Caucus disapproved. However, F.M. Forde 
did not use his undoubted authority against Arthur 
Calwell. Although the legality of Arthur Calwell*s 
suspension of the newspapers was not upheld, the 
matters involved were sufficiently important in the 
public interest in time of war to make it unlikely that 
any action would be taken against Arthur Calwell. 
Furthermore, with the Australian Labor Party in power, 
taking account of its powerful hostility to the press, 
Arthur Calwell was not subjected to as much pressure 
as might otherwise have been the case. The damage 
done was that in the press he had an implacable foe, 
which would distort his public image. While by his 
criticism of the press Arthur Calwell lost more than 
he gained, he could not help himself. His prejudice 
against the press was never shaken. He believed that 
it was the 'capitalist press' that kept the Australian 
Labor Party out of power; and from 1916 onwards the 
Australian Labor Party meant everything to him.
In the court case that followed the suspension 
of the six newspapers, Justice Sir Hayden Starke, for 
the newspapers, frequently asked counsel for the 
Commonwealth to indicate: 'Anything in the article 
complained against which was prejudicial to the defence 
of the Commonwealth* (I4.6) . Justice Dudley Williams,
who heard the case, commented on the articles: 'I read 
them and I cannot find any information in them which 
would be useful to the enemy1 (4 7)•
While the Commonwealth was using the case to 
establish the legality of the authority of the censor, 
the case for the press was not the power of the censor, 
but the misuse of power- Counsel for the Commonwealth 
was unwilling to justify particular items of censorship, 
while the press was unready to accept censorship unless 
it was so justified. Asked for an explanation of a 
particular item of censorship: ‘When counsel declined 
to do so, Mr. Justice Starke said it was clear tliat ho, 
counsel, could not do so' (i|.8). Counsel for the press 
did not raise the issue of ’Misunderstandings Abroad*, 
but concentrated on other censored items, where the need 
for censorship was less obvious. For example, the 
question of why reference to Arthur Calwell as the 
’Nazi Minister of Misinformation* had been deleted was 
answered by E.G. Bonney because it was: ’Bad for 
morale’ (14-9). E.G. Bonney dismissed the charge of 
political censorship, taking full responsibility on 
himself. He told the Court: * On the morning when I 
decided to put an order to submit on the Sydney 
Telegraph, I asked an officer to tell Mr. Calwell what 
I proposed to do. Mr. Calwell*s reply was that whatever 
I did he would support me* (50).
While R.A. Henderson's article alluded to censored 
material, it did not divulge the contents of the articles 
to which reference was made, so that it was not itself
divulging secrets, but yet indicauiii& material that did. 
Ihe newspapers won their case. An appeal to the High 
Court of Australia was also lost, with costs against 
the appelant: 'The full Bench of the High Court today 
adjourned sine die an application on behalf of the 
Commonwealth and the censors for discharge of the order 
made by the Court on April 17 which restrained the 
censor until April 21 from preventing publication by 
the Daily Telegraph of certain articles' (51)- The 
issues involved in the suspension of the Daily 
Telegraph continued to rankle with Arthur Calwell. He 
later referred to R.A. Henderson as a 'Quilp-like 
creature', adding that, if Japan had conquered in 
World War 11, the Sydney Morning Herald would have 
continued to appear, simply by changing its name to 
the Sydney Morning Shimbun (52). This drew from the 
editors a reply in kind: 'He is deliberately and 
maliciously lying* (5 3)*
On 7 April 1949, Arthur Calwell wrote to Abraham 
Landa, who was then Minister for Labour and Industry 
and Minister for Local Government in the New South 
Wales Legislative Assembly: 'You will remember that 
in my fight against the press in 1944 I telegraphed to 
McKell from Adelaide and he replied. He was miserable 
enough to publish his reply but did not give mine to 
the press' (54)* W. McKell, who was then Premier of 
New South Wales, had refused to allow the New South 
Wales police force to suspend the offending newspapers, 
necessitating Arthur Calwell's use of Commonwealth
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police, or 'peace officers1, an unusual manoeuvre, 
which had backfired. When the newspapers showed signs 
of resisting, the Commonwealth police, who were unused 
to common police work, were nonplussed. One was 
photographed with a revolver aimed at a truck 
driver (5 5)> with resulting adverse publicity.
In replying to Arthur Calwell1s protesting cable, 
W. McKell condemned Arthur Calwell1s 'rash and 
ill-considered approach' and published his criticism (5 6) 
This was most damaging, as it seemed to show that 
tension between the Commonwealth and New South Wales 
Labor Parties, which had developed during the 
Premiership of J.T. Lang, had not diminished. This bad 
publicity prompted Acting Prime Minister F.M. Forde to 
write to Arthur Calwell: 'The episode with Mr. McKell, 
Premier of N.S.W., was bad publicity at such a time as 
this. I strongly advise you to refrain from sending 
any further such telegrams, and pipe down on the whole 
question' (57). Otherwise, was the implication, Arthur 
Calwell would be considered unsuited for high office.
Ihe whole issue imposed great strain on Arthur 
Calwell. It received adverse publicity not only in 
Australia, but overseas too, where it was anticipated 
that Arthur Calwell would have to resign. The Daily 
Mail commented: 'If next Friday's judgment supports 
the newspapers, Calwell is expected to resign' (58)•
The Daily Express reported: 'Concerted efforts are 
being made to force the resignation of Mr. A.A.
Calwell' (59). Arthur Calwell responded angrily and
negatively to all such criticism. The Glasgow Herald 
reported him from Adelaide: 'There is no real patriotism 
in the Australian press. There are more fifth columnists 
in newspaper offices than in any other part of 
Australia' (60). His fundamental antipathy to the press 
was such that: 'In the last federal elections, Calwell, 
then not a Minister, declared himself in favour of 
abolishing private newspapers and establishing one 
Government organ' (61).
Arthur Calwell never forgot the issue. For 
example, when the question of appointing W. McKell 
Governor-General of Australia was put to Caucus, Arthur 
Calwell recalled: 'I voted against him' (62). He said 
he had let the matter pass at the time, as Prime Minister 
J.J. Curtin was overseas; and to have done anything 
else would have caused a furore. He had misplaced his 
cable to W. McKell and asked Abraham Landa for a copy of 
it because: 'Some day I will write something about the 
whole matter' (6 3)•
The feud with Sir Keith Murdoch continued, with 
both sides adding fuel to the fire. In 1949, in an 
article written while in Indonesia, Sir Keith Murdoch 
wrote: 'If Mr. Calwell likes to make a goat of 
himself' (6I4.), which he refused to retract when the 
matter in question was explained to him. In October 
19$2, in King's Hall, Parliament House, Canberra:
•Murdoch smiled at me in a way that was significantly 
patronising. It was more a smirk than a smile' (65).
As they passed, at a distance of twenty years, Arthur
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Calwell called out: 'You bloody old scoundrel*. He 
added: 'The next day, Murdoch died of a heart attack...
I have the impression that I had pointed the bone at 
him* (66). Clearly, the issues involved had penetrated 
deeply; the iron had entered their souls.
The impact of the conflict with the press was 
such that Arthur Calwell would find it difficult to 
avoid adverse publicity. For example, when in the 
Commonwealth Parliament he proposed that the depression 
had lasted until World War 11, so that men who 
volunteered for the armed forces did so to obtain 
employment, G.Vf. Holland, President of the Returned 
Soldiers' League, was given plenty of space to complain 
‘ that this was: *A slur on the motives of men who 
enlisted voluntarily and they will resent it' (67).
G.W. Holland claimed that, for patriotic reasons, many 
had left highly-paid positions to join the armed forces. 
He added: 'If this is the kind of information the 
Minister puts out it is a pity he cannot be censored 
himself* (68). Arthur Calwell reacted angrily to G.W. 
Holland's comment: 'Before he again tries to assist his 
United Australia Party friends by misusing his 
presidential office', he should be aware that Arthur 
Calwell was condemning the capitalist system that 
generated unemployment, not the men who were 
unemployed (69). Arising from this exchange, many 
people wrote to Arthur Calwell, most of them savagely 
unfair to him. However, they were writing in time of 
war, which may go some way to explaining their bitterness 
In the outcome, this and what had gcr.s oefore were
incidents which set the stage for what was yet to come.
Within three months of suppressing the Daily 
Telegraph, Arthur Calwell was again involved in another 
confrontation with the press. While campaigning on 
the 1944 referendum, Arthur Calwell became Involved in 
a most sensational affair which turned the press strongly 
against him, which in consequence did him damage in 
Parliament. It concerned the unsuccessful attempted 
escape of Japanese prisoners of war from their detention 
centre at Cowra, New South Wales. This was: 1 The 
greatest mass escape of prisoners-of-war in British 
military history' (70)- Arthur Calwell happened to be 
in Cowra on the night of the breakout, electioneering 
on a referendum to increase the powers of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. He took the referendum very 
much to heart, for he was always a supporter of greater 
powers for the Commonwealth Parliament. On 13 April 
1944> it was reported of the Australian Labor Party 
Conference that Arthur Calwell: • 'Gave a factual account 
of the negotiations between the Commonwealth and the 
States, and concluded with a forceful appeal to delegates 
to exert their utmost efforts to the carrying of the 
referendum' (7 1 )-
At the Cowra detention centre, there were too 
many prisoners for a camp of its size. The camp was 
shaped like a circle, with a perimeter of 800 yards.
It was divided into four segments which, by 1944> were 
all cramped for space (72). Consequently, it was 
decided to move D Camp, consisting of 1,100 Japanese
prisoners, to a camp in Hay, New South Wales and to 
another camp in Victoria. Under the Geneva Convention, 
the prisoners were given 24 hours' notice that they were 
to be moved. Their request to be kept together was 
refused (73). The Australian troops guarding the 
prisoners were from the 22nd Australian Garrison 
Battalion, most of whom had been Involved in active 
service overseas, but who were too old or for other 
reasons unsuited for further service overseas. There 
was bound to be trouble when the Japanese in D Camp 
decided on an ill-conceived and foolish bid to escape 
before they were moved. The attempt was made on 5 
August 1944-
The guard was not caught unprepared by the 
attempted escape of Japanese prisoners of war from 
Cowra. S.H. Jackson, Deputy Director of Security for 
New South Wales, who was quickly on the scene, reported 
that: 'The Commanding Officer of the Camp said that 
they had been anticipating a suicide attempt for some 
time and that a special arrangement had been made to 
meet it' (74). Nor was the Government caught 
unprepared because, through being on the spot, Arthur 
Calwell was able to inform Prime Minister J.J. Curtin, 
who ruled: 'I approve that censorship prohibit any 
references to this matter other than the official 
statements' (75)*
At 9 a.m. on 8 September 19^-, Prime Minister 
J.J. Curtin released a press statement which began:
•In the darkness at about 2 o'clock on the morning of
‘It
August 5 19l+4> over 900 Japanese prisoners of war in a 
camp in Australia made an unprovoked mass attack upon 
their guard1 (7b). In more terse terms, he added of 
the Japanese prisoners who attempted to escape: 'One 
officer killed, 230 other ranks killed or died by 
suicide*. Of Australian losses: 'One officer wounded. 
107 other ranks wounded' (77). In fact, four 
Australians died (78) . Of the 231 Japanese dead, he 
added: '20 died by hanging and strangulation inflicted 
by the Japanese on themselves, or on one another. Nine 
by suicide from stabbing, two by suicide under a train, 
five from a combination of self-inflicted wounds and 
gun shot wounds and twelve from causes unknown' (79).
The balance of 183 prisoners was shot while escaping.
In Cowra, Arthur Calwell*s chief concern was that; 
information about the breakout should not be published 
in the press, lest it result in reprisals against 
Australian prisoners in Japan. His Press Relations 
Officer at the time, Norman Macauley, who was with hin 
at Cowra, reported: 'The Minister waa immediately very 
concerned about the national security aspects of the 
situation1 (80). In particular: 'He mentioned the 
great danger of reprisals on 2^,000 Australians held 
prisoner by the Japanese if unauthorised reports were 
published'. Norman Macauley added: 'I think his 
words were: 'I will not allow any newspaper to gamble 
with the lives of Australians'' (81). In a letter to 
the Managing Editor of the Sunday Telegraph. J.J. Currin 
put it: 'If any hint of the incident reached the er.e—7
?7
prior to the official investigation and report by the 
protecting power, the interests of a large number of 
Australians held prisoner of war by the Japanese might 
be seriously prejudiced1 (82).
When the natter was raised in the Commonwealth 
Parliament, Arthur Calwell told the House: 'Some few 
aonth* ago I was in Cowra talking on the referendum when 
some Japanese prisoners of war broke out of camp. I 
■otually met a military convoy searching for the 
Japanese when I was on my way from Orange on the 
Saturday night' (8 3). Through being on the spot,
Arthur Calwell knew of the bloodshed that had taken 
place. The Japanese prisoners had decided to escape or 
to die rather than to suffer the greater dishonour of 
seing held prisoners. Rather than be recaptured, many 
of them committed suicide. Their procedure was reckless 
in the extreme.
In the Commonwealth Parliament, reference was made 
both to the Cowra breakout and to the suppression of the 
Daily Telegraph. On 21j. November 19i4i|, Archie Cameron, 
for the Opposition, said: 'We had just finished 
debating a bill for submission to the people of 
Australia, dealing with the freedom of the press, when 
the Minister for Information went to Sydney and promptly 
suspended the publication of four newspapers. In 
addition, he was guilty of suspending publication of a 
few more* (8I4.). Arthur Calwell was unrepentant. He 
interjected: *1 was never prouder of anything in my 
life' (86).
Archie Cameron based his criticism on a challenge: 
•I want to know whether the Minister secured legal 
advice from the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, 
or some other properly accredited legal authority, before 
he did this'. That was a leading question; and Arthur 
Calwell answered it: 'The answer is 'Yes1...! acted on 
the advice of the Solicitor-General1 (86). This was a 
most important point, as the Attorney-General was 
Dr. H.V. Evatt, generally recognised as the foremost 
lawyer amongst the Chief Justices of Australia, before, 
in 191+0, he entered the Commonwealth Parliament. In 
1914-6, he was still recognised as an expert in law. The 
Solicitor-General had acted with Dr. H.V. Evatt's 
approval; and to have his support at the time was as 
much as anyone could want. However, even here the matter 
was not as simple as it seemed: 'Evatt said to me:
'Why didn't you ring me earlier?' I replied: 'Because 
you would have tried to prevent me seizing the 
newspapers*' (87). As Attorney-General, Dr. H.V.
Evatt was supporting the Minister, although it appears 
that he may not have been consulted beforehand.
The High Court had rejected the advice of the 
Solicitor-General and of the Attorney-General. Arthur 
Calwell resolved this problem by proposing that the 
Solicitor-General was correct and that the High Court 
waa mistaken: 'I still prefer to believe that the 
Solicitor-General is a better lawyer than some members 
of the High Court bench' (88). He charged the judges 
with animus against the Australian Labor Party
Government: 'I believe that the law was undeniably on 
the side of the Government in the action taken and that, 
if it had been taken by another Government, the High 
Court's judgment would have been considerably 
different* (89). Arthur Calwell named the offending 
judges: 'Mr. Justice Starke and Mr. Justice Rich threw 
away their wigs when they took their seats on the High 
Court bench and openly barracked for the press' (90). 
Later on, he admitted that he had confused Justice Rich, 
though not Justice Starke, with some other judge: 'I 
made a mistake. It was not Rich, it was another shell 
back ingrate1 (91). The other judge involved was 
Justice Dudley Williams.
The Opposition and the press worked hard to 
capitalise on the case. For example, on 29 November 
191jij., A. Fadden commented: 'The item was featured in 
the Sydney Daily Telegraph and carried the heading in 
bold black type: "Calwell attacks High Court 
Judges"' (92). This line of criticism was continued 
by P. Spender:
The High Court is the custodian of the 
democratic liberties that some honourable 
members of this House would like to destroy.
Mr. Calwell: Rubbish (93)- 
Arthur Calwell's attack on the two judges was 
used by the newspapers to raise a storm against him.
The case against- Ar*h”r Calwell depended on the ruling 
that his action in suspending the newspapers was illegal. 
His claim, that he had done it to protect the interests
l®e>
o£ Australian soldiers, had to be balanced against his 
interference with the freedom of the press: 'Still we 
find that some Sydney newspaper proprietors are 
prepared...to jeopardize the fate...of Australian 
prisoners of war in the hands of Japanese, in order tc 
get what they call 'a good story11 (9 4)• On their side 
the newspapers suffered from a sense of grievance, for 
which Arthur Calwell was to pay a high price.
The press and the Opposition concentrated their 
criticism on the apparent illegality of what Arthur 
Calwell had done, preferring to ignore the reasons why 
he had done it. This put Arthur Calwell at a 
disadvantage, because the High Court had judged in their 
favour. He concentrated his attention on the unseemly 
behaviour of Prank Packer, the owner of the Daily 
Telegraph: 'I discovered, after consultation with 
officers of my Department, that Mr. Packer, of the 
Daily Telegraph had, in defiance of an instruction, 
published stories of that escape* (95). When warned 
against proceeding further in the same direction, F. 
Packer had published another story in the second 
edition of the Sunday Telegraph. According to Arthur 
Calwell, P. Packer had refused to desist: 'He said that 
he was just as good a judge of these matters as any 
censor' . The reason why P. Packer had not gone further 
than he had, was because the other newspapers would not 
support him: 'The Sydney Morning Herald, to its credit, 
faithfully observed the instruction which was issued' .
I Of
Newspaper reporting of the Covrra breakout was 
cautious. Following their earlier suspension, the 
newspapers were aware of the danger of further action 
being taken against them. Even so, Arthur Calwell 
referred the Daily Telegraph report to Sir George 3. 
Knowles, the Solicitor-General, who agreed that there 
was a case of breach of the censorship law because:
'The reference in the matter to some of the prisoners 
being in foxholes would, in the light of reports of the 
New Guinea campaign, be likely to convey to some 
readers the impression that the prisoners were 
Japanese' (96) . However, he advised against 
prosecuting the Daily Telegraph, because to do so would 
be to raise again the whole question of the freedom of 
the press. He concluded: 'It might therefore be 
desirable to postpone the proceedings for the time 
being' (97). However, the matter rankled with Arthur 
Calwell, so that when he spoke on the Cowra breakout 
in the Commonwealth Parliament, he referred to a 
breach of censorship by the Daily Telegraph. This 
triggered off further action against him by Brian 
Penton, who had several scores he wanted to settle.
The debate in the Commonwealth Parliament resulted 
in no censure of Arthur Calwell, whose actions had been 
unexceptional. However, the Daily Telegraph felt 
threatened and took the opportunity provided to bring 
matters to a head. On 25 November 19U+> its Managing 
Editor, Brian Penton, apparently libelled Arthur 
Calwell when, under the heading: 1dalwell can sue on
l o t
this1, he wrote: 'Smarting under a reminder of the 
humiliating defeat he suffered last April when he tried 
to suppress the newspapers, Mr. Calwell again lashed 
out at the press yesterday...Some time ago we libelled 
Mr. Calwell deliberately. We do sc again, by saying 
that he is maliciously and corruptly untruthful. In 
other words, a dishonest, calculating liar. And we 
invite him to take action against us. The statement 
should be worth £10,000 at least - if the court will 
give him a verdict' (98).
Arthur Calwell had little choice but to take 
action. A writ dated 29 November 19— ., for £25,000 
damages, was served by him against 3rian Penton. The 
issue involved, from Arthur Calwell13 point of view, 
was a personal slander or, from Brian Penton<s point of 
view, the freedom of the press. The hearing of the 
case was costly and protracted, as the Daily Telegraph 
raised complex legal issues. When it first came to 
court, Brian Penton pleaded privilege: 'We pleaded 
justification as well as qualified privilege' (99).
The claim for privilege would oblige Arthur Calwell to 
prove that his statements were true, in particular, 
that breach of censorship had occurred in reporting 
the Cowra breakout (100). Briar, Penton added: 'Our 
object in publishing the editorial challenging Mr. 
Calwell to sue was to demonstrate to the public that 
Mr. Calwell, under parliamentary privilege, was on this, 
as on other occasions, making statements he could not 
prove if he were called on to do so in a court of 
law' (1 0 1).
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On April 17 19J+5> Mr. Justice Dixon dismissed 
the defence on privilege (102). However: 'Penton 
appealed to the Pull Bench of the High Court of 
Australia and on August 5 the High Court by two to one 
majority upheld Mr. Shand's submissions, granting the 
defence qualified privilege1 (103). Brian Penton was 
next required to submit statements which he considered 
were untrue. He submitted a list of 87 such statements, 
which opened the way to a long litigation process:
•This document was served on Mr. Calwell last Monday. 
Yesterday Mr. Calwell withdrew his claim for 
damages' (lOij.) . Arthur Calwell could have appealed to 
the Privy Council against the award of qualified 
privilege to Brian Penton, or else he could have 
disputed the 87 statements, either of which would have 
been an expensive course of action. He commented: 'I 
have not the means to appeal to the Privy Council 
against a decision which my lawyers advise me is 
wrong' (105). Privately, he noted: 'I cannot afford 
to fight this rich press combine. The obvious intention 
of this newspaper is to destroy ne financially' (106). 
Eventually, on 28 August 191+5, Arthur Calwell 
discontinued the case. He commented: 'Because the 
defendant has taken shelter behind privilege to escape 
from the consequences of a challenge the Daily Telegraph 
threw out, but is afraid to stand by, the only course 
open to me is to discontinue the case' (1 0 7).
In the long run, adverse press publicity was to 
play a role in ensuring that Arthur Calwell would be
denied the prize he moat wanted, to be Prime Minister 
of Australia. When the time came to find a leader to 
replace J.B. Chifley, Dr. H.V. Evatt's stocks within 
the Commonwealth Parliamentary Labor Party were higher 
than were those of Arthur Calwell, who had gained a 
reputation from the press for the dramatic and the 
bizarre, which hindered him. That ha got this 
reputation was due largely to his conflict with the 
press, which he lost, which he could not win.
Although Arthur Calwell*s press coverage up to 
1961 was unflattering, so that many instances could be 
quoted of unsympathetic reports, the cartoonists were 
the most damaging of all. The cartoon portraying Arthur 
Calwell as a parrot, repeating: 'Curse the press, 
curse the press', which first appeared after the 
suppression of the Sydney newspapers (108), persisted 
in many different forms throughout Arthur Calwell's 
political career, to undermine his standing, to 
diminish his achievement.
Persistent criticism from the press ensured that 
even Arthur Calwell's finest achievements did not get 
the credit that was their due. He was to pay a high 
price for putting what he saw as the national interest 
ahead of what he believed to be a sectional interest.
His view of the press was not that held in law, which 
stands for the idea of a free press as a safeguard of 
a democratic society. It was a special plea for a 
limited press in wartime. However, in addition it was 
a view of the 'capitalist press' shared by most
I oS"
socialists, but which they rarely and perhaps wisely 
do not put into practice. Unlilce most people, once he 
held a belief, Arthur Calwell acted on it. He had no 
choice but to pay the high price that is the consequence 
of such idealism, whether it is mistaken or not.
Arthur Calwell saw it as his duty to press his 
view because he believed that, in wartime, the national 
interest demanded it. His interpretation was not upheld 
by the Courts, where legal precedents have mostly been 
determined in times of peace. It will always be a 
matter of opinion on which side the national interest 
lay. A non-Labor Minister of the Commonwealth 
Parliament, the historian and, later still, Governor- 
General of Australia, Sir Paul Hasluck, commented: 'At 
a distance of some years the files of newspapers during 
1943 provide much evidence of a low level of editorial 
responsibility and scant regard for national interests 
in time of war1 (109). The same could be said with 
even more justification of 19U4* when the war over 
censorship was at its height. While, by ensuring nim 
adverse press publicity, the conflict damaged Arthur 
Calwell, it drew attention to censorship. Henceforth, 
the newspapers took steps to ensure that the Minister 
had no reason for successful intervention. The r.atior. 
benefittea from this new vigilance.
loG
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